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China and Brazil:
Potential Allies or Just BRICs in the
Wall?

Anthony Peter SPANAKOS*

Brazil is a increasingly important actor in global governance and for China
specifically. Sino-Brazilian relations have deepened considerably but they
remain concentrated in areas of trade and investment. There is also
considerable overlap in interests between the two countries in other areas, such
as diplomatic and political relations. At the same time, China must manage
carefully important differences that exist over the enlargement of the UN and
the potential challenge to the Brazilian industry.

THE YEAR 2009 was a good year for Brazil. In March, the People’s Republic of
China (PRC) surpassed the United States of America to become Brazil’s largest export
market. In June, president Luís Inácio Lula da Silva met with his counterparts from
Russia, the PRC, and India in the first BRICs summit. In September, the G-20, in
which Brazil plays an important role, declared that it was the primary site for international
governance, not only for issues of global finance, but also global trade imbalances,
* Anthony Peter SPANAKOS is Assistant Professor, Political Science and Law, Montclair State
University.
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poverty, hunger, and climate change. Finally, on 1 October 2009, the International
Olympic Committee selected Rio de Janeiro, over Chicago, Madrid, and Tokyo as the
host city for the 2016 Summer Olympics. This can be interpreted as the world’s
recognition of the increasing capacity and importance of Brazil.
Brazil has become increasingly important to China as a trade partner, a market for
Chinese goods, and as a potential proponent of a more multipolar world in which the
South is better represented in global governance.

The Rise of BRICs
The term “BRICs” (Brazil, Russia, China, and India) first appeared in a 2001 Goldman
Sachs research team report that identified the most important emerging market countries
for their clients. The BRIC countries were responsible for 42% of the world’s population,
14.6% of its GDP, and 12.8% of global trade in 2008. They also hold US$2.5 trillion
in reserves and US Treasury bonds. While quite diverse in terms of levels and areas of
development, the four countries are large, important markets, which are critical to global
commercial and investment markets (Table 1).
Although the emergence of BRICs has been discussed for roughly a decade, it was
not until June 2009 that the four countries held a joint summit. The summit received
considerable attention but it produced few concrete outcomes. The final document
TABLE 1

BRICS COMPARISON

Brazil

Russia

India

China

Population

198,739,269

140,041,247
(July 2009 est.)

1,166,079,217
(July 2009 est.)

1,338,612,968
(July 2009 est.)

GDP (ppp)

$1.99 trillion
(2008 est.)

$2.225 trillion
(2008 est.)

$3.267 trillion
(2008 est.)

$7.8 trillion
(2008 est.)

GDP per capita

$8,197 (2008)

$11,807 (2008)

$1,016 (2008)

$3,315 (2008)

GDP per capita ppp

$10,100 (2008 est.)

$15,800 (2008 est.)

$2,800 (2008 est.)

$6,000 (2008 est.)

Inflation rate
(consumer prices)

5.8% (2008 est.)

13.9% (2008 est.)

7.8% (2008 est.)

6% (2008 est.)

GDP real growth rate

5.50% (2008)

6% (2008 est.)

6.6% (2008 est.)

9.8% (2008 est.)

Stock of money

$131.1 billion
(31 Dec 2007)

$252.5 billion
(31 Dec 2008)

$250.9 billion
(31 Dec 2007)

$2.434 trillion
(31 Dec 2008)

Market size index

22 (rank: 4) (2008)

27 (rank: 3) (2008)

39 (rank: 2) (2008)

100 (rank: 1) (2008)

Adult literacy rate

89.6 (rank: 70/147)
(2006)

99.4 (rank: 10/139)
(2005)

61.0 (rank: 114/139)
(2005)

90.9 (rank: 54/139)
(2005)

HDI

0.807 (rank: 70/179)

0.802 (rank: 67/177)

0.619 (rank: 128/177)

0.777 (rank: 81/

(2006)

(2005)

(2005)

177) (2005)
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spoke of common interests and a need to move towards a more multipolar world, but
made only passing mention of moving away from the US dollar as a global currency.
All of the countries offer powerful opportunities for China, though Sino-Brazilians
relations will be the most trouble-free. Russia’s sporadically thorny relationships with
the United States and Europe offer very real potential threats to Chinese efforts at a
‘peaceful rise,’ especially since Russia is a major supplier of arms to China. China is
also suspicious of Russian energy diplomacy given recent threats to cut off energy
shipment to Europe and the Ukraine. Finally, Russia and China are competing for
influence, along with the US, in Central Asia, an issue that was highlighted by Xinjiang
protests in July 2009. Russia has also been concerned about Chinese interest in energy
acquisition through Central Asia. This has been especially important given weak credibility
of property rights regimes within Russia and the problems in establishing the Siberian
pipeline.
Despite improved diplomatic
relations between India and China,
territorial disputes remain, especially with
Of the BRIC countries,
many within the US, and elsewhere, who
believe that a rising India can help
only Brazil has neither
balance the power of a rising China.
territorial claims against
Indian and Chinese geostrategic interests
differ considerably and there is some
nor geostrategic differences
competition between the two economies
with China, and China has
for positioning as a low-cost producer.
Additionally, although India has a large
no territorial claims in the
and rapidly growing economy, GDP per
capita is significantly lower than that of
Western Hemisphere, let
China and its internal market does not
alone Brazil.
offer the same opportunities for
consumption of Chinese goods as do the
Russian and Brazilian markets.
Of the BRIC countries, only Brazil has neither territorial claims against nor geostrategic
differences with China, and China has no territorial claims in the Western Hemisphere,
let alone Brazil. Moreover, while Russia might try to leverage China vis-à-vis the West,
and the West might try to do the same with India against China, Brazil is comfortably
located in the world’s most peaceful region (in terms of inter-state war), has no territorial
disputes with any of its neighbours, and maintains peaceful relations with all major
powers.
Like China, Brazil favours a multipolar world, is active in multilateral and regional
institutions, and opposes open confrontation with the US. While Brazilian diplomats
often disagree with US positions, they do so within the context of multilateral institutions,
most visibly the WTO or G-20, and they do so only in coalition with others, such as
India and South Africa.
Brazil also offers considerable advantages over many of China’s partners in its energy
east asian policy
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security foreign policy. The search for petroleum has often meant entering into negotiations
with pariah regimes, placing China in the awkward position of having to choose between
non-intervention and its responsibility as a ‘stakeholder’ in the international system.
Such situations are very unlikely with Brazil.
Brazil also seems to have been one of the last countries affected by the global financial
crisis and the first to emerge. Its growth in 2009 was among the most robust within the
G-20 and whereas foreign direct investment (FDI) in the world in 2008 declined by
14%, it increased by 30% in Brazil. Tellingly, in 2008, Moody’s rating agency elevated
Brazilian debt to investment grade status.

Sino-Brazilian Relations: Commonality of Interests
Brazil is the largest country in Latin America and boasts the region’s largest economy.
It is the world’s fifth largest country in terms of size and population, fourth largest
democracy, and tenth largest economy. It is one of Latin America’s few diversified
markets; its domestic consumer market is large and its financial sector is highly
sophisticated and dominated by Brazilian public and private banks (Table 2).
Brazilian foreign policy has, like its Chinese counterpart, been largely determined by
domestic economic development. For much of the twentieth century, economic
development was seen as a product of internal development, and so Brazilian foreign
policy and trade was limited. With the return to democracy in 1985, Brazilian foreign
policy became more vocal, but still could not credibly justify its long term interest in a
permanent seat at the Security Council of the United Nations.
President Fernando Henrique Cardoso (1995-2002) maintained close relations with
the US during the Clinton and Bush administrations (1993-2001, 2001-2009) and
aimed to diversify the country’s trade profile by trying to maintain an equal amount of
trade among the world’s three largest markets/regions (the US, EU and Asia), while
also encouraging growth within South America through the Southern Common Market
(Mercosur). Cardoso also expended political capital on the need to include more countries
TABLE 2

BRAZIL: SOME BASIC FACTS

Population

198,739,269

GDP (ppp)

$1.99 trillion (2008 est.)

GDP per capita

$8,197 (2008)

GDP per capita ppp

$10,100 (2008 est.)

Inflation Rate (consumer prices)

5.8% (2008 est.)

Growth

5.50% (2008)

Stock

$131.1 billion (31 December 2007)

Market Size Index

22 (rank: 4) (2008)

Literacy

89.6 (rank: 70/147) (2006)

HDI

0.807 (rank: 70/179) (2006)

Sources CIA world factbook, IMF, UNDP, and ://globaledge.msu.edu/ResourceDesk/mpi/
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in global governance, particularly following the Asian financial crisis in 1997, and he
gave symbolic attention to Brazil’s relations with Sub-Saharan Africa, particularly fellow
Portuguese-speaking countries.
The foreign policy of Luís Inácio Lula da Silva (2003-2010) built on that of Cardoso
and took advantage of economic stabilisation in Brazil and the propitious international
environment to launch a more active, yet pragmatic, foreign policy. Lula continued to
favour balancing commercial interests between the US, Europe and Asia, while
maintaining priority on developing regional blocs, especially Mercosur. Lula also, more
than his predecessors, emphasised the importance of building South-South relations as
a way of gaining leverage against trade barriers in developed markets.

Bilateral Trade
The Federal Republic of Brazil and the People’s Republic of China have had formal
relations since 1974, but Sino-Brazilian relations only became important in the 21st
century when Chinese demand for raw material imports necessitated increasing imports
from resource-rich states like Brazil (Table 3). In this way, the Brazilian economy offers
significant complementarity to the Chinese economy. The two countries are also among
the few developing countries with companies large enough to offer meaningful foreign
direct investment. Finally, Sino-Brazilian relations are potentially fertile ground for
relations that go beyond energy needs and commercial relations. They offer the
opportunity for both countries to elevate their South-South agendas and serve as a
highly visible platform at efforts towards constructing a multipolar world.
Although Chinese interest and trade in Latin America has boomed in the last decade,
the Chinese government chose Hu Jintao’s 2004 address before the Brazilian Congress
TABLE 3

CHINESE TRADE WITH BRAZIL (IN $100 MILLION)

Total Trade Growth Rate
of Trade

Chinese
Exports to
Brazil

Chinese
Imports
from Brazil

Trade Balance

2001

37.0

…

13.5

23.4

-9.9

2002

44.7

20.8

14.7

30.0

-15.3

2003

79.8

78.5

21.4

58.4

-37.0

2004

123.6

54.8

36.7

86.8

-50.1

2005

148.2

20.0

48.3

99.9

-51.6

2006

203.0

37.0

73.8

129.2

55.4

2007

297.0

46.4

113.7

183.3

-69.6

2008

425.4

81.0

166.4

259.1

-92.7

Source: Jiang, Shixue. “The Panda Hugs the Tucano: China’s Relations with Brazil.” China
Brief 9, 91. May 15, 2009. pp. 7-10.
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as the site from which he would set the goal of increasing Sino-Latin American trade to
US$100 billion by 2010. This goal was reached in 2007 and trade has continued to
expand very rapidly since. Not only has this goal been exceeded, Sino-Brazilian trade
has also become increasingly important, particularly to Brazil for whom China is now
the largest export market.
Between 2004 and 2008, Brazil grew at 4.7% (nearly double its average growth
during the previous two decades) and Sino-Brazilian trade has grown far more robustly.
Most significantly, in March 2009, Brazilian exports to China exceeded those to the
United States, making China the largest export market to Brazil.
Recent economic growth has increased Brazilian demand for Chinese products,
leading to increasing trade deficits with China. But the greater concern, on the part of
many in Brazil, is the composition of this trade. Brazilian petroleum, iron and soy are the
three largest components of Brazilian exports to China and commodities as a percentage
of Brazilian exports to China were over 68% in 2005 and 74.5% in 2006. The number
is now closer to 82%. Table 4 shows the composition of Sino-Chinese trade between
2004 and 2008. Importantly, while Brazilian exports to China are concentrated in
commodities, China’s exports to Brazil are diversified.
Brazilian FDI in China and Chinese FDI in Brazil were some US$270 million and
TABLE 4 COMPOSITION OF SINO-BRAZILIAN TRADE
2004

2005

2006

2007

Millions H S Millions H S
of Dollars
of Dollars

2008

HS

Millions
of Dollars

HS

Millions H S Millions
of Dollars
of Dollars

China’s

12

1621.8

26

1891.8

26

2686.5

26

3808

12

5324

Principal

26

1169

12

1717.1

12

2431.7

12

2832

26

5171

Imports

15

496.5

27

558.1

27

835.9

27

840

27

1703

China’s

85

1387.2

85

2137.2

85

3157.9

85

4319

85

6308

Principal

84

410.2

84

760.8

84

1379.8

84

2347

84

3713

Exports

27

365.3

29

396

29

471.4

90

700

29

1195

from Brazil

to Brazil

12
15
26
27
84
85
87
90

86

Oil Seeds/Misc. grains/Med. Plants/Straw
Animal or Vegetable Fats, Oils and Waxes
Ores Slag and Asah
Mineral Fuels, Oils, Waxes and Bituminous Sub
Nuclear Reactors, Boilers, Machinery & Mechanical Appliances, Computers
Electrical Machinery, Equip. and Parts, Telecommunications Equip, Sound Recorders,
Television Recorders
Vehicles other than Railway or Tramway Rolling Stock
Optical, Photographic, Cinematographic, Measuring, Checking, Precision, Medical or
Surgical Instruments and Accessories
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US$210 million by October 2008, respectively. Most of the Chinese investment was in
the area of steel production, an arrangement between Chinese Baosteel and the Brazilian
Compania Vale do Rio Doce, while the largest Brazilian investment in China was done
by the Brazilian airplane manufacturer Embraer. Most recently, the Chinese government
invested US$10 billion in the Brazilian state-owned PETROBRAS to secure a future
flow of 200,000 barrels of petroleum per day. There is considerable room for more
investment, especially for Chinese companies given the great level of privatisation and
more institutionalised regulatory environment in Brazil.
Perhaps the most important element of Sino-Brazilian relations is the possibility of
trade between the two countries taking place in local currencies. While visiting China,
Lula and Hu announced that they were considering the possibility of abandoning their
use of the dollar for bilateral trade. Conducting bilateral trade in local currency means
that the country running a surplus (China) will not increase its US dollar reserves and it
would respond to a Chinese concern about the long-term value of the US dollar,
particularly important given that Chinese US dollar reserves and Treasuries account for
some 30% of Chinese GDP.
China’s goals of growing its status/soft power as well as making Shanghai a financial
capital like London and New York by 2020 suggest a need to make its currency more
convertible and easily used. Certainly as the world’s second biggest trader, potential
demand for Chinese currency is high and the Chinese authorities seem to be accelerating
the move towards convertibility. Wang Zhaoxing, vice-head of the Shanghai branch of
the China Banking Regulatory Commission, spoke of the possibility of the renminbi
becoming a reserve currency by 2020, while others have spoken of making many
transactions in reminbi convertible by that date.
The problem is that while China is seeking to reduce its exposure to US dollar
assets, holding reals is neither a better alternative nor an optimal strategy. Reals have
little value and would, either need to be converted into a hard currency, or re-invested
back into Brazil. Indeed, trade in local currency would encourage Chinese businesses
to recycle surpluses in reals into direct investment, but it is unreasonable to expect the
entire Chinese surplus to return to Brazil in investment. Although the Chinese Central
Bank could buy excess reals, there would be little value in doing so and China’s move
towards diversifying currency assets away from the US dollar will lead it to hard
currencies like the Euro or Yen, not the real.
Similarly, Brazilian companies will hold and need to acquire renminbi, something
that is complicated because it is not fully convertible and there is no liquid market into
which they can tap. The Brazilians can potentially sell their excess renminbi to the
Brazilian Central Bank which may eventually consider the renminbi a global reserve
currency. But, realistically speaking, this will not happen for some time, and, this limits
the utility of Brazilian companies trading in renminbi.
Ironically, despite shared long-term interests, in the short term, the most likely thing
to be done with reals is to sell them and get USD, an option that is not available for
renminbis. This is why the talk of local currency trade between China and Brazil is
more about strategy and politics than immediate economic impact.
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Economic Competition
Although the Brazilian economy complements that of China, the reverse is less true.
Brazil obviously benefits from improved trade with a producer of cheap industrial and
consumer goods. But Brazilian industry faces serious competition from Chinese peers
and this has affected relations. Brazilian diplomats also differ from the Chinese on the
issue of expanding the number of permanent members of the United Nations Security
Council.
Brazilian firms have lost space to Chinese competitors in third markets, including the
US and South American markets where Brazilian products have been gaining space. A
recent study shows that Chinese competition is responsible for 30% of Brazilian losses
in the United States and Chilean markets, and 11% and 14% losses in Argentine and
Mexican markets respectively. These losses are especially acute in certain industrial
sectors, such as the shoe market where Chinese competition is blamed for 90% of
Brazilian losses in the US shoe market.
This has led to critiques, particularly from São Paulo’s conservative industrial base,
about Chinese ‘neo-colonialism’. The composition of Chinese trade and the competitive
advantage gained by higher Chinese productivity and a more favourable exchange rate,
has encouraged critiques of China from Brazil’s powerful FIESP (Federation of Industries
of the State of São Paulo). This has encouraged demands for protectionism and an
increasing resort to anti-dumping measures. Since 1989, 20 percent of Brazil’s
antidumping measures have been against Chinese manufacturers.
There is also a longer-term threat for Brazil as it may face a ‘middle income trap’ in
that its production costs are too high to compete with low wage producers like China
and Vietnam but its production quality is too weak to compete with those of South
Korea and Germany. There are, of course, areas in which Brazilian industrial and service
industries are quite competitive and Brazil is probably the most shielded from this trap
within Latin America. Nevertheless, aggregate production does face this challenge. If
the Brazilian and Chinese governments do not give enough attention to increasing
investment within Brazil, this could be a long-term source of resentment of China and a
threat to deepening relations.
In addition to commercial and long-term structural challenges, Sino-Brazilian relations
have disappointed in a core area of shared interest: ‘democratising’ global governance.
While both governments have spoken of the need to make global governance more
democratic and open to developing countries, they have differed on the matter of
expanding the number of permanent members of the UN Security Council. For Brazil,
such an expansion means not only a more inclusive UN, but it specifically means including
Brazil within the privileged club of permanent members of the UNSC.
Brazil has secured the support of France, Russia and India, among others, all of
whom claim similar goals and recognise that including Brazil would be critical for improving
the legitimacy and representativeness of the UNSC.
China, alone among the BRICs, resists supporting an expansion of the Security
Council as such an expansion would probably mean the inclusion of Japan. As a result,
Chinese diplomats are caught in a perceived inconsistency of wanting to ‘democratise’
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and be ‘inclusive’ but rejecting the possibility of inclusion in one of the most important
global fora. If, as has been rumoured, the US selects a Brazilian, possibly Lula, as the
next head of the World Bank, breaking with the tradition of nominating US citizens, this
would increase pressure upon Beijing on the issue of the UNSC.
While the issue of UN Security Council enlargement may limit foreign policy
coordination of China and Brazil, there is potential for the two countries to share concerns
on environmental issues. At the December 2009 Copenhagen meeting, world leaders
discussed climate change and the possibility of consensual emissions targets to replace
the Kyoto Protocol. On 25 November 2009, the US government issued a statement
promising to reduce its emissions by 17% by 2020 and 83% by 2050. The day after,
the Chinese government promised to reduce carbon dioxide intensity by some 45% by
2020. The Chinese government was disappointed with the US figures, and Western
observers noted that Chinese emissions will continue to grow and China is more concerned
with energy efficiency than reduction of emissions.
Both the Chinese and Brazilian governments have chafed at the idea of environmental
constraints on economic growth, particularly when they have not perceived enough to
be done on the part of developed nations. But they have had, until this point, very
different strategies. China, as the larger power and emitter, has favoured direct
negotiations with the US. Brazil, for its part, wants the developed world to subsidise its
environmental policies. French president Nicholas Sarkozy has supported the idea of a
financial services tax which would help support environmental issues in Brazil and other
developing countries.
The potential for cooperation between Brazil and China is considerable leading up
to the Copenhagen meeting in December of 2009, but for all of China’s discussion
about BRICs and inclusion, China has preferred to handle this issue unilaterally with the
US and, to a lesser extent, directly with the EU. The opportunity for a coalition of large
developing countries with interests balancing emissions constraints against economic
growth is present but China seems uninterested in leading such a group. Moreover,
Brazil’s interest is not so much to continue growing with emissions, as it is to have
financial support for environmental policies.

Warming Relations
Despite these differences, Brazil has the potential to be an important long-term market
and global ally as China pursues a ‘peaceful rise’ and to increase its status across the
globe. Brazil is already an important source of commodities for China as well as an
important market for Chinese products, and it figures in China’s long-term planning for
expanded use of the renminbi. Brazil is also a stable, non-confrontational supporter of
a shift towards a more multilateral form of global governance and its support will be
important to facilitating China’s peaceful rise and ‘harmonious world.’
An overlap of interests and preferences should not be taken for granted though.
China must be especially sensitive to the need to invest in Brazil’s nontraditional
commodity-based sectors and it will need to come up with a more nuanced, if not
altogether different, stand on the place of Brazil within the United Nations. 
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